B. FROM UNADORNED WELFARE TEST TO PARTIAL CHECKLIST
The welfare test, as applied to intra-family disputes, is found in Part I of the 1995 Act. Very much a product of the recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission, the statute directs courts to regard "the welfare of the child concerned as its paramount consideration". 9 The original version of the Act said nothing further about welfare. That was no accident, since the Commission had rejected a welfare checklist, quite explicitly, on the basis that it would be family members in the upbringing of children. 5 Elaine E Sutherland, "Listening to the Voice of the Child: The Evolution of Participation Rights" (2013) 26 NZLR 335 and Elaine E Sutherland, "Listening to the Child's Voice in the Family Setting: From Aspiration to Reality" (2014) 26(2) CFLQ 152. 6 That simile was first used by the present author in an in-depth analysis of the drafting and impact of article 3 of the CRC: Elaine E Sutherland, " In 2006, in response to concern over two specific issues, the impact of domestic abuse on children and the obstruction of contact by the child's resident parent, the 1995 Act was amended.
In assessing welfare, courts are now required to have regard "in particular" to the need to protect the child from domestic abuse. 12 When they are contemplating making an order that would require adults to co-operate with each other, courts are directed to "consider whether it would be appropriate to make the order". 13 In effect, there is now a partial welfare checklist that highlights two important factors, but makes no mention of other considerations that might be of equal or greater relevance in a given case -one of the very dangers the Commission had sought to avoid.
Arguably, this half-way house is the least satisfactory option: having a partial checklist is worse than having none at all. Another limitation of checklists is that they do not normally indicate the relative weight to be accorded to the different factors but, then, a strict hierarchy would detract from individualised decision-making. There is also the possibility that different factors on the checklist will point to contradictory conclusions. All of that leaves considerable scope for judicial discretion, something noted by John Eekelaar many years ago, when he observed, "a judge can consider almost any factor which could possibly have a bearing on a child's welfare and assign to it whatever weight he or she chooses." 26 That may be so, but a degree of judicial discretion is inevitable in individualised decision-making.
C. REINING IN THE WELFARE TEST
There is a further danger, stemming not from welfare checklists themselves but, rather, from the process of drafting them. There is the possibility that a particularly vocal lobbying group will advocate for a particular course of action, drowning out other voices and skewing the way welfare decisions are taken. That was the experience in Australia when those supporting "shared parenting" prevailed and the existing legislation was amended, in 2006, giving equal weight to the benefit of the child having a "meaningful relationship" with both parents and the need to protect the child from exposure to domestic abuse. 27 
D. GUIDANCE FROM THE UNCRC
In General Comment 14, 30 the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) offered extensive guidance on how to implement the requirements of article 3(1) of the CRC, according primacy to the child's best interests in all decisions affecting the child. 31 The
Committee was well aware of the criticisms levelled at welfare checklists and the following is its elegant solution:
The Committee considers it useful to draw up a non-exhaustive and non-hierarchical list of elements that could be included in a best-interests assessment by any decision-maker having to determine a child's best interests. The non-exhaustive nature of the elements in the list implies that it is possible to go beyond those and consider other factors relevant in the specific circumstances of the individual child or group of children. All the elements of the list must be taken into consideration and balanced in light of each situation. The list should provide concrete guidance, yet flexibility.
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The UNCRC saw no need to strive for completeness since a non-exhaustive, non-hierarchical list of elements provides the flexibility that will ensure individualised decision-making. It went on to provide full discussion, not only of the elements it saw as central, 33 but also of how the assessment and determination should be carried out, requiring evaluation to be by means of a "transparent and objective formal process" 34 that incorporates "child-friendly procedural safeguards". When the 2014 Act was being drafted, it was suggested that the term "wellbeing" should replace "welfare" in all of the legislation dealing with children. The criticism that "welfare" is ambiguous pales into insignificance when one contemplates how a court would determine what will make a child feel "nurtured" or "respected" or "included". Happily, the suggestion for legislative amendment sank without trace. Should it resurface, the distinct history and nature of wellbeing provide ample reason to reject its pervasive -and wholly inappropriate -use.
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E. THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM
F. CONCLUSION
That the welfare or best interests test has much to commend it is evidenced by its widespread use in domestic legislation and adoption in the CRC. Even Mnookin, its arch-critic, observed, "While the indeterminate best-interests standard may not be good, there is no available alternative that is plainly less detrimental." 
